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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON C. YOUNG M.D., P.C. 
P'laintif f/Appel lant/ 
Peti tioner 
vs. Case No. 860350 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE Category 6 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Claim Representative, 
Jody L. England, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented in this case is whether the Claimant-
Respondent, Jody L. England, was properly allowed unemployment 
insurance benefits under section 35-4-5(b)(1), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended (Laws of Utah, First Special Session, Ch. 20, 
section 3), on the grounds she was not discharged for just cause 
or for an act or ommission in connection with employment which 
was deliberate, willful or wanton and adverse to the employer's 
rightful interests. 
A second issue presented in this case is whether the employer, 
Vernon C. Young M.D., "P.C., should be relieved of charges for 
any benefits paid to the Claimant-Respondent pursuant to section 
35~4-7<c> <3> (F)(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (Utah 
Legislative Report 1985). 
PERTINENT PULES 
Rules B.l. and 2., Department of Employment Security Un-
employment Insurance Rules, pertaining to section 35~4-5(b)(l) 
of the Utah Employment Security Act, provides as follows: 
B. JUST CAUSE 
1. The basic factors which establish just 
cause, and are essential for a determina-
tion of ineligibility are: 
a. Culpability 
There is the seriousness of the conduct or 
the severity of the offense as it affects 
continuance of the employment relationship. 
The discharge must have been necessary to 
avoid actual or potential harm to the em-
ployer's rightful interests. A discharge 
would not be considered "necessary" if it 
is not consistent with reasonable employ-
ment practices. The wrongness of the con-
duct must be considered in the context of 
the particular employment and how it af-
fects the employer's rights. If the con-
duct was an isolated incident of poor 
judgment and there is no expectation that 
the conduct will be continued or repeated, 
potential harm may not be shown and there-
fore it is not necessary to discharge the 
employee. 
<1) Longevity and prior work record are 
important in determining if the act or 
omission is an isolated incident or a good 
faith error in judgement. An employee who 
has historically complied with work rules 
does not demonstrate by a single violation, 
even though harmful, that such violations 
will be repeated and therefore require dis-
charge to avoid future harm to the employ-
er. For example: A long term employee who 
does not have a'history of tardiness or 
absenteeism is absent without leave for a 
number of days due to a death in his immed-
iate family. Although this is a violation 
of the employer's rules and may establish 
just cause for discharging a new employee, 
the fact that the employee has established 
over a long period of timer that he complie 
- 2 
with attendance rules shows that the sir-
cumstance is more of an isolated incident 
rather than a violation of the rules that 
is or could be expected to be habitual. In 
this case, because the potential for harm 
to the employer is not shown, it is not 
necessary for the employer to discharge the 
employee, and therefore just cause is not 
established. 
b. Knowledge 
The employee must have had a knowledge of 
the conduct which the employer expected. 
It is not necessary that the claimant in-
tended to cause harm to the employer, but 
he should reasonably have been able to an-
ticipate the effect his conduct would have. 
Knowledge may not be established unless the 
employer gave a clear explanation of the 
expected behavior or had a pertinent writ-
ten policy, except in the case of a fla-
grant violation of a universal standard of 
behavior. If the employer's expectations 
are unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent, the 
existence of knowledge is not shown. A 
specific warning is one way of showing that 
the employee had knowledge of the expected 
conduct. After the employee is given a 
warning he should be given an opportunity 
to correct objectionable conduct. Addi-
tional violations occurring after the warn-
ing would be necessary to extablish just 
cause for a discharge. 
(1) For Example: When the employer has an 
established procedure of progressive disci-
pline, such procedures generally must have 
been followed in order to establish that 
the employee had knowledge of the expected 
behavior or the seriousness of the act. 
The exception is that very severe conduct, 
such as criminal actions, may justify imme-
diate discharge without following a pro-
gressive disciplinary program. 
Rule F.l. and 2., Dep'artment of Employment Security pertaining 
to section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act, 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
F. PROXIMAL CAUSE—Relation of Offense to 
Discharge 
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1. The cause for discharge is that conduct 
which motivates the employer to make the 
decision to terminate the employee's serv-
ices. If the decision has truly been made, 
it is generally demonstrated by way of no-
tice to the employee or the initiation of a 
personnel action. Although the employer 
may learn of other offenses following the 
making of the decision to terminate, the 
reason for the discharge is limited to that 
conduct of which the employer was aware 
prior to making the decision. . . . 
2. When the discharge does not occur immed-
iately after the employer becomes aware of 
an offense, a presumption arises that there 
were other reasons for the discharge. This 
relationship between the offense and the 
discharge must be established both as to 
cause and time. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah pursuant to section 35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 
1Q53, as amended, seeking judicial review of a decision of the 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Claimant-Respondent Jody L. England ("England" hereafter) 
filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits on January 
2, 1986. On February 6, 1986 a representative of the Utah Depart-
ment of Employment Security ("Department") ruled that England 
was eligible to receive benefits (See Appendix A). Petitioner 
Vernon C. Young M.D., P.C. ("Young") appealed that determination. 
A de novo hearing was helcf before an Administrative Law Judge, 
who affirmed the Department's decision. (See Case No. 86-A-973, 
Appendix tn . Young then filed an appeal of that decision with 
rthe Board of Review. By its decision issued June 13, 1986, 
the Board of Review adopted the Findings and Conclusions of 
the Administrative Law Judge, held that England was entitled 
toreceive benefits, and-also held that Young was liable for 
charges for benefits paid to England (See Case No. 86-BR-215, 
Appendix C). (All "R" prefixed notations refer to pages from 
the record). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are set forth to correct statements 
of facts contained in Respondents' brief. 
When the petitioner, Dr. Young, was first asked by the 
Department
 fto state his reasons for discharging the claimant 
from employment, the petitioner listed all his reasons 
on Job Service's form 606. On an attachment to Job Service's 
form 606 tardiness was one of the main reasons cited for the 
claimant's dismissal and was not "mentioned only in passing1' 
as the respondent contends. R.0108 through 0110. Of the times 
England was tardy, most (74 times) involved tardiness of 15 
minutes or less, however, 21 times involved 15 minutes or more, 
5 times involved 1 hour or more, and 1 time involved an unexcused 
absence. R. 0087 through 0088. Additionally, the office manager 
stated that one of the main reasons for terminating the claimant 
was because the claimant "was . . late a lot of the time." "R. 0039. 
The claimant specifically denied petitioner's assertion 
that she had been advised that she would be discharged if she 
continued to be tardy. R. 0052. However, on January 1, 1986 
the claimant admitted on Job Service's form 615-C that the petitioner 
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had spoken to her about her tardiness once and only once in 
late October. R. 0106. Notwithstanding this admission, in April 
1986, four month later, in the course of the administrative 
hearing the claimant stated that the petitioner had spoken to 
her about her tardiness in the month of August. R. 0052, 0053, 
0063. 
During the hearing the petitioner s office manager 
stated that "we decided that, . . . we were going to replace 
Jody (claimant) but we would wait until after Christmas to replace 
h&r.M R. 0045. However, at no time prior to December 27, 1985 
did the petitioner (Dr. Young) state that he had decided to 
terminate the claimant. In fact, the office manager stated 
that Dr. Young (petitioner) had given the claimant a warning 
concerning her tardiness on December 10, 198^. R. 0046. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I 
Regarding the question of evidentiary support, this Court 
will dei&r to the Board of Review s findings of fact unless 
they are without substantial support in the record so as to 
be arbitrary and capricious. The Board of Review has failed 
to consider some evidence regarding the claimant's tardiness 
during the last month that claimant worked and the conduct that 
was the proximate cause of the claimant's discharge. Additionally, 
the Board of Review decision is not supported by the record. 
Since vital evidence was not considered in the decision and 
the Board of Review's decision lacks adequate support in the 
record, the decision is not reasonable nor rational and is arbitrary 
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and capricious, so, it should be reversed. 
Point II 
The claimant's tardiness was not condoned by the petitioner 
as was held by the Administrative Law Judge. In addition, the 
seriousness of the claimant's conduct is supported by the record 
while th© Board of Review's position is not. Therefore, the 
decision should be reversed in favor of the petitioner. 
Point III 
There is substantial evidence in the record that proves 
that the claimant had knowledge of the conduct expected of her. 
Also, all of the requirements in Rule A71-07-1:5(a)(3)(b) have 
been met allowing no doubt that the claimant had the necessary 
knowledge. Therefore, the decision should be reversed in favor 




^- The Employer proved that the claimants tardiness occurring 
r1 *ter December 10, 1985 was the legal proximate cause of claimant's 
P* ^ charge and that the Board of Review incorrectly determined, 
as a matter of law, that the tardiness prior to December 10, 
*^Q5 was was not the proximate cause of claimant's discharge. 
Rule F., Department of Employment Security Unemployment 
Insurance Rules, ("Rules") pertaining to Section 35-4~5(b)(1) 
of the Act, provides in material part as follows: 
F. PROXIMAL CAUSE—Relation of Offense to 
Discharge 
1. The cause for discharge is tnat conduct 
which motivates the employer to make the 
decision to terminate the employee's serv-
ices. If the decision has truly been made, 
it is generally demonstrated by way of no-
tice to the employee or the initiation of a 
personnel action. Although the employer 
may learn of other offenses following the 
making of the decision to terminate, the 
reason for the discharge is limited to that 
conduct of which the employer was aware 
prior to making the decision. . . . 
2. When the discharge does not occur immed-
iately after the employer becomes aware of 
an offense, a presumption arises that there 
were other reasons for the discharge. This 
relationship between the offense and the 
discharge must be established both as to 
cause and time. . . . 
This Rule provides a reasonable manner in which the Court may 
determine the proximate cause for the discharge of the employee. 
In applying such rule to the specific facts of this case, the 
Board of Review has not acted reasonably, nor rationally, nor 
within the scope of its authority under the Utah Employment 
Security Act. 
The Rule just cited in part F. Proximal Cause 2. states, 
"When the discharge does not occur immediately after the employer 
becomes aware of an offense, a presumption arises that there 
were other reasons for the discharge. However, after the Admini-
strative Law Judge stated in his decision, affirmed by the Board 
of Review, that "On November 12, 1985, the supervisor at last 
noted <* problem with the claimant's attendance, but the office 
manager was very busy with personal family matters and she could 
not let the claimant go." On this evidence the Administrative 
Law Judge stated that "When the discharge does not follow the 
commission of the action against the employer's interests in 
a customary sequence of events, the burden falls on the employer 
to establish casual relationship." R. 0033, 0034. In the present 
case no action was taken by the petitioner immediately following 
the tardy arrivals of the claimant prior to November 12, 1985. 
Since no action was taken by the employer the presumption in 
Rule F. Proximal Cause 2. should apply to the present case and 
not the rule cited by the Administrative Law Judge. Therefore, 
the Administrative Law Judge's decision is neither reasonable 
nor rational because an erroneous presumption has been used 
in his decision. 
Additionally, part F. Proximal Cause 1. states, "The cause 
for discharge is that conduct which motivates the employer to 
make the decision to terminate the employee's services. If 
the decision has truly been made, it is generally demonstrated 
by way of notice to the employee or the initiation of a personnel 
action." The Administrative Law Judge based proximate cause 
on his conclusion that the petitioner's office manager had made 
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a decision to terminate the claimant on November 12, 1985 which 
is incorrect. R. 0033. The office manager is not the petitioner 
and in the record there are no facts which show that the petitioner 
made a decision to terminate the claimant until December 27, 
1985. In fact, the petitioner according to the record warned 
the claimant on December 10, 1985 that if she continued to be 
tardy she would be discharged. R. 0046. The record also show 
that at no time prior to December 10, 1985 did the petitioner 
state that he had decided to terminate the claimant. However, 
had the petitioner decided to terminate the claimant prior to 
December 10, 1985 Rule F. Proxirr.al Cause 1. cited above indicates 
that some personnel action on the petitioner's part should have 
been taken to prove that a decision had truly been made. No 
action was taken on November 12, 1985 by the petitioner. Addi-
tionally, the respondent presented evidence the claimant presented 
evidence that no warning was given claimant nor personnel action 
taken by the petitioner regarding the claimant tardiness prior 
to November 12, 1985 or prior to the December 10, 1985. R. 
0052, 0058. Besides, why would the petitioner warn the claimant 
about her tardiness on December 10, 1985 if he had already decided 
to discharge her on November 12, 1985. R. 0046. 
Since an incorrect Rule has been applied to the specific 
facts of the present case, the Board of Review has not acted 
reasonably nor rationally. The Court has stated ". . . . unless 
the administrative law judge's decision based on the Proposed 
Rules and Regulations is outside the limits of reasonableness 
ur rationality, we will uphold it." Kehl
 v. Board of Review 
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of Industrial Commission, Department of Employment Security, 
Utah, 700 P.2d 1129 (1985), Therefore, the conclusions of the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Board of Review being outside 
the limits of reasonableness or rationality should be reversed. 
POINT II 
The Record establishes the seriousness of 
claimant's conduct sufficient to meet the 
culpability requirement. 
Rule A71-07-2:5<a) (3) (a) , proposed Pules o^f the Department 
of Employment Security, defines culpability as follows: 
a. Culpability 
This is the seriousness of the conduct 
or the severity of the offense as it affects 
continuance of the employment relationship. 
The discharge must have been necessarv to 
avoid actual or potential harm to the em-
ployer's rightful interests. A discharge 
would not be considered "necessary" if it 
is not consistent with reasonable employ-
ment practices. The wrongness of the con-
duct must be considered in the context of 
the particular employment and how it af-
fects the employer s rights. If the con-
duct was an isolated incident of poor 
judgment and there is no excpectation that 
the conduct will be continued or repeated, 
potential harm may not be shown and there-
fore it is not necessary to discharge the 
employee. 
The Administrative Law Judge held that M Considering the 
substantial tardiness without any action taken by the employer, 
it is held the claimant's behavior was condoned." R. 0009. This 
holding was affirmed by the Board of Review. R. 0007. Here, 
the respondent contends that due to the lack of an apparent 
lack of action by the petitioner, the claimant's tardiness was 
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condoned. This simply i^ not true. The Petitioner presented 
evidence that serveral warnings were given regarding tardiness 
as well as o^her problems had been given the claimant. R. 0084-0086, 
0039, 0049, 0106, 0107, 0063, 0052. Also, the claimant admitted 
that she had at least one conversation with the petitioner. In 
-fact, the claimant stated that she had the same conversation 
with the petitioner in late October and in August. R. 0106, 
0O53. Possibly the claimant had more than one conversation 
regarding her tardiness and has conveniently forgotten additional 
conversation with the petitioner. The statements made by the 
Administrative Law Judge and the respondent that the Petioner 
did nothing is simply not supported by the evidence. 
The respondent contends that the claimant's tardiness was 
not serious. The Rule states that the discharge must have been 
necessary to avoid potential harm only, therefore, actual harm 
need not be shown to meet this requirement of fault. Petitioner 
presented evidence of potential harm to his business had the 
claimant not Deen discharged. Petitioner s nurse was threatening 
to quite because of having to cover for the claimant in addition 
to performing her own duties, R. 0082, 0042, 0043, patients 
were often delayed and inconvenienced due to the claimant's 
tardiness, O082, and daily appointments were lost because the 
claimant was not present to answer the telephone, R. 0084. 
Since the petitioner did in fact attempt to get the claimant 
to arrive on time, the contentions made by the respondent are 
simply not supported by the evidence. Remember, Rule A71-07-1: 
5(a)(3) <b) states that after the employee/claimant is given 
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a warning she should be given an opportunity to correct objec-
tionable conduct- The petitioner gave the claimant approximately 
six months to correct her conduct without success and is now 
being punished for it by the Board of Review. 
In the present case it is necessary that the Board of Review's 
findings and facts be supported by any substantial evidence 
before the Court can accept such findings and facts. Kennecott 
Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, 
13 Utah 2d 262, 264-265, 371 P.2d 987, 989 (1962). The question 
is, therefore, whether the Board of Review's factual determination 
find any substantial support in the record. The petitioner 
asserts that no such support cant be found in the record, howeverf 
the substantial support can be found in the record for the peti-
tioner's factual determination. Therefore, the decision of 
the Board of Review should be reversed. 
POINT III 
Knowledge of what conduct was expected of 
claimant by petitioner is well substan-
tiated in the record. 
Rule A71-07~l:5(a)(3)(b), proposed Rule of the Department 
of Employment Security defines Knowledge as follows: 
b. Knowledge 
The employee mufet have had a knowledge of 
the conduct which the employer expected. 
It is not necessary that the claimant in-
tended to cause harm to the employer, but 
he should reasonably have been able to an-
ticipate the effect his conduct would have. 
Knowledge may not be established unless the 
employer gave a clear explanation of the 
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expected behavior or had a pertinent writ-
ten policy, except in the case of a fla-
grant violation of a universal standard of 
behavior. If the employer's expectations 
are unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent, the 
existence of knowledgeis not shown. A 
specific warning is one way of showing that 
the employee had knowledge of the expected 
conduct. After the employee is given a 
warning he should be given an opportunity 
to correct objectionable conduct. Addi-
tional violations occurring after the warn-
ing would be necessary to establish just 
cause for a discharge. 
The respondent contends that claimant had never been told 
*hat her tardiness was unaccepatable. P. 0052, 0056, 0057, 0058. 
However, the Rule states that a clear explanation is needed 
except in the case of flagrant violation of a universal standard 
of behavior. The record shows that the claimant was tardy 807. 
of the time. R. 0087, 0088, 0041. Surely, punctuality is a 
universal standard oi behavior, so, the claimant fits within 
the exception to the clear explanation requirement to establish 
knowledge. It should be noted that the claimant admitted that 
she had no excuse for her tardy behavior. R. 0057. Nevertheless, 
the record also indicates that the claimant admitted that she 
had indeed been told that her tardiness was unacceptable to 
the petitioner on at least one occasion and perhaps two occasions, 
R. 0106, 0063, 0052. The Petitioner also claims in the record 
that the claimant had been told several times that her tardiness 
was unacceptable. R. 0042, 0043, 0082, 0084. The Administrative 
Law Judge's decision stated "In the present case, there was 
little doubt the claimant had a tardiness problem.H R. 0009. Surely 
the record shows that the claimant had an understanding of the 
conduct expected of her by the petitioner. 
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Additionally the above the Rule states that it is not necessary 
that the claimant intended to cause harm to the employer, but 
she should reasonably have been able to anticipate the effect 
her conduct would have. To be sure, any person with average 
intelligence would be able to determine what 807. tardiness would 
have an adverse effect on their emplover's business- Especially 
when several of the daily business appointments were made each 
morning. Also, such adverse effects of 21 late arrivals in excess 
of 15 minutes by the claimant and 5 late arrivals in excess 
of 1 hour would be reasonably anticipated. 
In conclusion the claimant surely had knowledge of the 
conduct expected and the adverse effect that her tardy conduct 
had upon petitioner's business. The claimant certainly meets 
all the requirements oi the rule governing knowledge and the 
Court should certainly conclude that the knowledge requirement 
was in fact met. Since the Board of Review's and respondent's 
factual determination is not supported by any substantial evidence 
in the record the Board of Review's decision should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, petitioner Vernon C. Young M.D., P.C. 
does hereby respectfully request that this Court reverse the 
Board of Review's decision granting the claimant unemployment 
benefits, with instructions to enter an Order for petitioner 
declaring that the claimant was discharged for just cause and 
misconduct pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-4-5<b) <1), 
and awarding petitioner recovery of all benefits charges assessed 
against him. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th dav of December, 1986. 
Ronald D. Young 
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